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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
vs.
DENNIS D. KAZDA,

SUPREME COURT NO. 14201

Defendant - Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLA.~T

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict, which found the Defendant guilty of third-degree felony theft, in the Third Judicial
District Court, Tooele County.
DISPOSITION BELOW
This case was tried to a jury on the 12th and 13th day of
June, 1975 before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the
District Court.

The Judge charged the jury with the requested in-

structions, one of which Defendant took exception to, and which is
the subject of this appeal.

The jury returned a verdict finding

the defendant, Dennis D. Kazda, guilty as charged.

The Court then

sentenced the Defendant to serve an indeterminate term of up to
five years in the Utah State Prison.

The Court permitted defendant

Kazda to serve this sentence concurrently with his present incarceration there fora different and unrelated conviction.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

O~~

APPEAL

Appellant asks this Court to set aside the jury verdict of
June 13, 1975, and to grant Appellant new trial.
~.ATT

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

-LAW

TREET

TY.

On or about September 1, 1974, appellant Kazda met with one

.

j

-2Mr. Johnson, whom Kazda believed worked for Mountain Bell Telephone
Company.

Mr. Kazda's belief was based on the fact that Mr. Johnson

was driving a white El Camino or Ranchero truck with Mountain Bell
decals on the sides.

Mr. Johnson represented to appellant Kazda

that he was so employed.

Mr. Kazda and Mr. Johnson met at a truck

yard near the Mountain Bell offices on Redwood Road and 21st South,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mr. Johnson told Kazda of a pending contract

bid for the removal of unused telephone lines which were presently
strung in the Tooele, Rush Valley Area.

(T 174).

Mr. Kazda, be-

lieving Mr. Johnson's offer of contract to be truthful, accompanied
Mr. Johnson to the Hogan Ranch in Rush Valley, Tooele County,

I

w:1ere Mr. Johnson was going to show him which telephone lines were
to be cut down.
Mr. Kazda submitted a written bid to Mr. Johnson for $22.20
per mile for the removal of these wires.

(T 175).

On September 26,

1974, appellant Kazda and Mr. Johnson travelled to the Hogan Ranch
in Rush Valley, Tooele County.

At that time, Mr. Johnson showed

him which lines were to be removed.

(T 176).

As a result of Mr. Kazda's meeting with Mr. Johnson and the
subsequent trip to the Hogan Ranch on the 26th, Mr. Johnson presented a contract to Mr. Kazda which they both signed.

Mr. Kazda

was to remove the designated wires and would be paid $22.20 per
mile for the removal.

This contract is identifed as Defendant's

Exhibit 24 and was admitted into evidence by the Court.

(T 193).

During this September 26, 1974 trip to the Hogan Ranch, Mr.
Kazda ·was driving his brown, 4-wheel drive Dodge pickup, which is
registered and licensed in his name.
RATT
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(T 169).

by Mr. Johnson from the telephone company.

He was accompanied

Kazda and Johnson

I

surveyed the telephone lines on the Hogan Ranch at which time Mr.
Johnson pointed out to the Appellant which lines were to be cut
down.

( T 176) .
On this same September 26th day while Kazda and Johnson were

touring the Hogan Ranch, Kazda's truck became stuck in an irrigation
ditch.

At this time the truck was in full view of Mr. Degelback,

employee of the Hogan Ranch who was the prosecutions first witness
at trial.

Mr. Kazda got out of his truck and went over and spoke

with Mr. Degelback.

(T 18, 19).

come onto the Hogan Ranch.

Kazda asked for permission to

He stated that he had a contract from

Mountain Bell to take down the telephone lines and wanted permission
to re-enter in order to do so.

(T 19, 172).

This occurred some

time during the afternoon of the 26th which Mr. Degelback has pinpointed as being between 3:30 and 4:00 P.M.

(T 21).

Believing that he had a valid contract, Kazda hired his
co-defendants Mr. Reay and Mr. Stockton to help him remove the
wires.
On October 1, 1974 defendants Kazda, .Reay and Stockton came
onto the Hogan Ranch at approximately 8:00 in the morning.

They

entered the Hogan Ranch by the main route from the City of Stockton,
and proceeded through the main barnyard which goes directly past
the Hogan's house.

Mr. Leland Hogan, a prosecuting witness, saw

the brown Dodge pickup truck which was later identified as belonging to the defendant Kazda on the morning of October 1st.

(T 32).

Mrs. Joyce Hogan the wife of Leland Hogan also saw the truck enter
the barnyard and drive past the house.

She also identified the

truck as being a brown Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup.
,An
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She claimed

the Defendants entered the yard at 8:00 in the morning.

(T 49).

I
I

-4Both Mr. and Mrs. Hogan later observed three individuals, who
were later identified as defendants Kazda, Reay· and Stockton,
stopping their truck about 100 yards from the Hogan's house.

The

truck was parked in an open field within full view of the highway
and the Hogan's home.

The Defendants proceeded to cut down the

telephone wires.
Leland Hogan was somewhat concerned about the presence of
these three individuals on his land, and went out of his house and
observed with a pair of binoculars, their activities.

At this

time all three Defendants were in full view of the house and were
making no attempt to conceal their activity.

I

(T 34).

Mrs. Hogan also testified that she observed the Defendants
cutting down the wires.

She indicated however, that she did not

ever see them load the lines into the truck.

(T 51, 54).

The Defendants continued to cut the wires from the telephone
poles in full view of Leland Hogan who was standing outside his
home.

Mr. Hogan became suspicious and went into his house to

telephone the Sheriff.

(T 50).

While Mr. Hogan was calling the

Sheriff, Mrs. Hogan continued to observe the Defendants activities.
Mr. Hogan did call the Sheriff •·s Department (T 32) and the
Sheriff in turn called the telephone company.

Mr. Winchester, a

Mountain Bell employee, received the call from the Sheriff's office.

I

Mr. Winchester and Mr. Manzione who is also a Mountain Bell employee then went to the Hogan Ranch to investigate.

(T 60).

Mr.

Winchester and Mr. Manzione approached from the same route the
Defendants had used in entering the Hogan Ranch.

They entered the

barnyard, drove past the Hogan's home and spoke to the Hogans
~ATT
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who were at that time observing the Defendants.

Mr. Winchester

I

-5then drove down and spoke with the Defendants.
When Mr. winchester and Mr. Manzione approached the Defendants,
they were no longer cutting wires, but were sitting on defendant
Kazda's truck.

One of the Defendants indicated to Mr. Winchester

that they had a contract to remove the wire, but had stopped because the wire had fallen against a power line.

The Defendants did

not know how to get the telephone wires away from the hot line.
Mr. Winchester testified that the Defendants indicated they were
pleased to see Mr. Winchester and Mr. Manzione.

The Defendants

hoped these telephone company employees would help them remove the
wires from the power lines.

(T 64).

Mr. Winchester did testify that the Defendants represented to
him that they had a contract to take the wires from the poles.

The

Defendants however failed to produce a copy of the written contract.
(T 64) •

Mr. Winchester was concerned about the validity of the contract and returned to the Hogan's house to use the telephone.
Manzione remained behind with the three Defendants.

Mr.

During Mr.

Winchester's absence the three Defendants were alone with Mr.
Manzione and the defendant Kazda's 4-wheel drive pickup truck.
(T

104) .
While Mr. Winchester was telephoning Salt Lake City, the

Sheriff's Deputy arrived on the scene.

Deputy Park asked the

Defendants what they were doing on the Hogan Ranch.

They responded

that they had a contract to remove the wire and were doing so.
Deputy Park asked the individuals for an identification which they
readily produced.
!ATT
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(T 101, 105, 144).

A second deputy came, Wayne Jones who testified for tl:le

-6prosecution, arrived on the scene.

He joined Deputy Park and

waited for Mr. Winchester to return with information of the
contract from Salt Lake City.

When Mr. Winchester returned and

said Mountain Bell had no record of any contract with Mr. Kazda,
Deputies Jones and Park arrested all three of the Defendants.
(T 114) .

Therefore, in all encounters with the prosecutions witnesses
defendant Kazda indicated that he had a valid contract with Mountain
Bell for the removal of these telephone wires.

I

He indicated he had

been told by Mr. Johnson which of these wires he was to cut down.
(T 176).

Mr. Johnson is the individual with whom Mr. Kazda con-

tracted for the removal of the wire.

Kazda testified that Mr.

Johnson went with him to the Hogan Ranch and showed him which ,vires
he was to cut down.

(T 172).

Defendant Kazda testified Mr. Johnson

was with him on the day he spoke with Mr. Degelback and that he
knew which wires to cut down because Mr. Johnson had shown him.
(T 176).

Mr. Winchester testified that there is no way with the naked
eye to distinguish which lines were or were not in service at the
time the Defendants were cutting them down.

(T 82).

Winchester

testified that an individual must either have had access to
Mountain Bell's records or have testing equipment with them in the
field.

Winchester testified that this testing equipment is avail-

able to the public, but stated the Defendants did not have any
testing equipment with them at the time of their arrest.

(T 81).

He further testified that Mountain Bell's records which would
indicate which lines are in service are available only to Mountain
~ATT
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Defendant Kazda is not nor has he ever
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-7been an employee of Mountain Bell.
Therefore, it must be assumed that Mr. Johnson existed.

That

he was in fact an employee of Mountain Bell and that he had access
to Mountain Bell's service records.

That on the 26th day of

September, 1974, Mr. Johnson did accompany defendant Kazda to the
Hogan Ranch and told Kazda which wires were out of service and
should be removed.
There were approximately twelve telephone lines on the poles
involved on that day.

Six of those twelve lines were in service.

I

Mr. Winchester identified those lines as nos. 7, 8, 5, 6, 3 and 4.
(T 73).

He testified that lines no. 9, 10, 1, 2, 17 and 18 were

not in service, and that these were the only lines which had been
cut by the Defendants.

(T 74, 81).

Defendant Kazda took the stand in his own behalf.

He testified

that he openly entered the ranch property during the daylight
hours, spoke openly on September 26th to Mr. Degelback.
identity was not concealed in any way.

His

He drove his own truck

to the Hogan property which is licensed and registered in his own
name.

(T 169).

Kazda testified that he again entered the property

about 8:00 A.M. on October 1, 1974 for the purpose of removing the
wire under the alleged contract.
aware of people on the ranch.

Defendant Kazda indicated he was

He saw cars parked around the yard

and assumed that people were present.

(T 191) .

At no time on October 1st, did any of the witnesses observe
any of the Defendants attempt to leave the area, even though the
Defendants had a 4-wheel drive vehicle and knew of another exist,
(T 172, 113), which would have taken them safely away from the
,ATT
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approaching telephone truck.

All witnesses testified that defendant

I

I

-8Kazda and his companions were working in an open field which was
clearly visible from the road.

Kazda testified that he had clear

vision of the road and could see any approaching vehicle for some
distance.

(T 172).

Even with this clear view of the highway, the

Defendant did not attempt to leave the area when they saw the
telephone truck approaching.
Leland Hogan.

(T 54, 55).

This is verified by the testimony of

Defendant Kazda testified on the stand

that he observed the approaching telephone truck long before its
arrival.

Nevertheless, he did not attempt to leave the area,

(T 185), even though he knew of another exist.

(T 185).

Mr. Winchester, the telephone company employee testified that

none of the Defen~nts atte~ted to leave the area. (T 78,183).
Mr. Manzione, also a telephone company employee was left alone with

the three Defendants ~ile Winchester made his call to Salt Lake
City.

I
1

Manzione testified that none of the three Defendants attempt-

ed to overpower him or leave, even though they had a 4-wheel drive

vehicle and knew of an escape route. (T 104, 183, 184) •

I

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Defendant
intended to cut and remove the wire from the Hogan Ranch.

In fact,

defendant Kazda himself testified that he was suppose to cut the
wier down and simply leave it on the ground for Mountain Bell.
He believed Mr. Johnson was going to come along, coil up the wire
and take it back for reuse.

(T 18, 19).

The States witnesses who

observed the Defendants cutting the wire down, testified that they
never saw the Defendants coil the wire or attempt to load it into
his truck.

No witnesses saw any spools in the truck or any

mechanism which would have aided in the coiling and removal of the
~ATT
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wire.

(T 47, 51, 54).

I
I

-9Leland Hogan testified that he never saw the Defendants load
the wire or ta.ke it away.
similarly.

('1' 47) •

Witness Joyce Hogan testified

She observed the Defendants cut the wire and drag it

along the ground, but never saw them place it in the truck.
54).

(T 51,

Mr. Winchester testified that he observed no spools for the

coiling of wire, and saw no wire in the bed of the truck.

In fact,

he testified that the lines were still hanging from the poles.
(T 78, 79).
the truck.

Deputy Jones testified that there were no wires in
He further testified that the telephone company employ-

ees in fact had to climb the poles and cut the wire down themselves.
(T 116).

Defendant Kazda testified himself that once the wire was

cut he was to leave it for Mountain Bell to pick up.

(T 186).

Therefore, he did not intend to take the wire with him.
spool on which to coil the wire.
removal from the area.

He had-no

He had no mechanism to aid in its

(T 186).

The validity, and even existence of the contract which defendant Kazda claims he has is somewhat in question.
of Mountain Bell testified on (T 58)

I
I

Mr. Winchester

that whenever lines are to

be removed from Mountain Bell's poles, that i t is either done by
the telephone company itself or by private contractors.

He stated

that if private contracts are let, that he himself would have the
information concerning when, where and who.

(T 57, 58).

Winchester

further testified that when private contracts have been let, that
he is given a copy of that contract.

(T 58, 59).

I

Winchester further

testified that when he telephoned Salt Lake City on October 1st to
confirm Defendants contract, Mountain Bell had no records of any
contract with the Defendant.
~ATT
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(T 65).

Mr. Winchester testified on cross-examination however, that if

I

-.LU-

an u.,.~authorized contract was issued for the removal of wires to a
private individQal, that he would have no notice or record of it
whatsoever.

(T 76).

The fact that the Defendants only cut those lines which were
not in service lends validity to Defendants belief that a valid
contract existed.

Kazda testified that Mr. Johnson accompanied

him to the Hogan Ranch on September 26th.

(T 176).

Mr. Johnson

at that time pointed out those wires which were to be removed.
Mr. Winchester testified that the wires which were cut by the
Defendants were all out of service.
disturbed.

(T 74, 81, 82).

No in service lines were

Winchester further testified that with-

out testing equipment a person must have had access to Mountain

.
Bell's records in order to know which lines were not in service.
(T 82).

He also stated that only Mountain Bell employees have

access to these records.

Defendant Kazda was not a Mountain Bell

employee.
Defendant Kazda testified that the extent of his formal education was the eleventh grade; junior year in high school.
not have a high school diploma.
of little formal education.

(T 168).

He does

I

He is therefore a man

He is not likely to be aware of any

formal contracting procedures which a large corporation might
employ.

He based his belief on the contract's validity upon the

representations made to him by Mr. Johnson, whom he believed worked
for Mountain Bell.

Defendant Kazda reasonably believed that he

had a valid contract.
On October 1, 19 7 4, defendant Kazda who is the Appellant here

I

and Mr. Reay and Mr. Stockton were arrested by the Tooele County
RATT
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Sheriff.

They were charged and tried for the crime of third-degree

i

'
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felony theft.

Defendant Kazda was convicted on this charge.

co-defendant Mr. Stockton was acquitted.

His

Appellant Kazda was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5 years in the Utah State
Penitentiary.

It is from this conviction that the Appellant appeals .
.POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN HONEST
MISTAKE OF FACT CONSTITUTES AN ABSOLUTE STATUTORY DEFENSE TO
THEFT, THEREBY PREJUDICING THE DEFENDANT, AND PREVENTING A FAIR
A!~D IMPARTIAL DETERMINATION BY THE JURY.
It is a well recognized general rule that things which are
not excepted to at trial and instructions which are not requested
to be given may not later be raised as grounds for appeal.

The

I
I

Supreme Court will generally not take notice of them where exception
was not made at trial.

There is a generally recognized exception

to the above stated rule which is applied in many jurisdictions.
Those courts will take notice of error which exists on the records

I

in many criminal cases involving capital offenses or other serious
offenses involving long term imprisonment.

The error which must·

exist on the record must be so manifestly prejudicial to the
Defendant that it denied him his fundamental rights of a fair
trial and prevented the jury from making a fair and impartial
determination of the facts and evidence.

The Court may notice such

error even though they were not made a ground for appeal by taking
exception to them at trial.

The Utah Supreme Court follows this

general exception.
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952, the Defendant Cobo
was charged and tried for murder and the jury convicted the
Defendant of voluntary manslaughter.

The Defendant and the deceased

were drinking in the Defendants home and the Defendant asked the
(1\TT
L;-\\V

rY.

deceased to leave.

The deceased did leave, and obtain more liquor

I

-.1.L;-

and return to the Defendants home.

He pounded on the door and Cobo

stepped out onto the porch where he confronted the deceased.
engaged in a fist fight.

They

The Defendant struck the deceased several

times in the head and the deceased fell dead.

Medical examination

indicated that he died from a subdural hemorrhage.

The Defendant

was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a crime which involves
as a necessary element a specific intent to kill.
The Court in its charge to the jury made no mention whatsoever
of the necessary element of intent to kill which must exist in order
to convict of voluntary manslaughter.

No exception was taken by

counsel for the Defendant at trial to the giving of these instructions.

However, it was excepted to on appeal.

In this regard,

t~e Court stated as follows:
"We recognize the well settled general rule in this and
other jurisdictions that alleged errors with respect to
instructions and in refusing a request to instruct ordinarily will not on appeal be considered or reviewed unless
sufficient exceptions were taken in the Court below by
the party aggrieved. Such rule however is not uniform as
to all errors so committed. In many jurisdictions there
are well recognized exceptions to the general rule especially in criminal cases involving capital offenses or other
grave and serious offenses of long term imprisonment, and
sometimes has been applied even in civil cases, where
papable error on the face of the record involved violations of fundamental rights and privileges of manifest
prejudice to the party aggrieved." (Citations admitted).
The Court having recognized the general rule, stated that it
would apply the stated exception in:
capital cases and in cases of grave and serious
charged offenses and convictions of long terms of
imprisonment, cases involving the life and liberty of
the citizen, we think that when papable errors made to
appear on the face of the record and to the manifest
prejudice of the accused, the Court has the power to
notice such error and to correct the same, though no
formal exception was taken to the ruling."
11 • • •
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The Court then stated that they had already considered the

I
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elements of voluntary manslaughter and that one of the essential
elements was the willful or intentional killing of the deceased.
The Court then stated the charge to the jury wholly eliminated
this essential element.

It allowed the jury to convict the

Defendant without finding that the killing was either willful or
intentional.

Thus the jury was misdirected and convicted the

Defendant on less than the required evidence.
In reversing the Court stated:
"That such error was manifest and of necessity resulted
to the prejudice of the accused and deprived him of a
fair trial cannot well be doubted. Because of such
manifest error and further because, as already indicated,
that the judgment of the Court below must be reversed,
and a new trial granted upon other grounds, we deem it our
duty to notice t~e error and to correct it, since no
exception was taken thereto, in order that on a retrial
of the case the same error may not again be committed."
Thus, the Court held that where the instructions given failed
to include an essential element

of the crime and that this failure

worked such a total prejudice to the Defendant that if followed. by
the jury it would prevent a fair and proper disposition of the case,
that the Court must notice the error even though exception was not
taken at trial.

Where such prejudice is found, a reversal of the

conviction and a new trial is mandated.
The Utah Supreme Court again followed this rule in State v.
Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504 (1952).

Here, the Def~ndant

I

was charged with larceny and was convicted by a jury of that crime.
The Defendant took the stand in his own defense and upon crossexamination testified of previous felony convictions.

The Trial

Court failed to instruct the jury that such testimony bore only on
Defendants credibility as a witness, and not on hisculpable conduct.
.LA.\"v'
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However, Defendants counsel failed to take exception to the failure

I

-14of the Court to so instruct.
The Supreme Court noted the well recognized rule that exceptions
to instructions not taken at trial will not be reviewed by the
Court.

The Court however noted the well known exception as stated

in State vs. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P. 2d 354, 360:
"Having approved the instructions as given and requested
no others, counsel· should not be heard to complain that
the Court did not constitue itself counsel in the cause,
and submit other theories not urged by the Defendant
just because the Court may think such theories of defense
could have been urged. It is the Courts duty to try
the issue made by the parties and not to make the case
for them. We have held that where instructions are
palably erroneous to such an extent that they would, if
followed by the jury, prevent a fair and proper determination of the issues, we may notice the error without exception having been taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89,
60 P. 2d 952; State v. Waid-, 92 Utah 279, 92 Utah 279,
97 P. 2d 647. But we are aware of no holding that the
mere failure to given instruction which might have been
given, but which was not requested or called to the
attention of the Court, and no exception taken to the
failure to give it will be noticed on appeal."
Thus, the Court held that it is not to play the part of defense
counsel in the case and will not submit mere defense theories simply
because the Court feels such theories could have been urged by

I
I
I
I
.

defense counsel at trial.

The Court noted however, that where the

failure to give such instructions would prejudice the case to the
extent that if followed by the jury i t would prevent a fair and
impartial determination of the issues that the Court may notice the
error even without exception having been taken at trial.
Here, the Court felt there was no such prejudice and affirmed
the Trial Court.
Thus, the rule in Utah is that the Court will not assume the
role of advocate.
1RATT
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take notice on appeal of errors which were not excepted to a trial.

-15There is an exception to the rule state above which the Utah
Supreme Court has followed.

That is where counsel fails to have

the jury so charged or the failure of counsel to take exception
to an instruction which was so erroneous that the effect would
allow the jury to convict without finding the existence of all the
essential elements of a crime, then the Court may take notice even
without exception having been taken at trial.
Very early in the history of the Utah territory, the territor-

I

ial Supreme Court applied the Common Law Rule that absent an intent
to steal, a conviction of larceny may not be sustained.

The Court

also applied the common law defense that an honest mistake in
point of fact negates the necessary intent to steal, and therefore
a conviction of larceny may not be sustained.
In People vs. Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 Pac. 514 (1886), the
Defendant was convicted of larceny.

At trial, evidence was intro-

duced which established that the Defendant took the property .in
question under a mistaken belief of title in himself thereto.
Defense counsel asked the Court to charge the jury as follov1s:
"If the jury believed from the evidence that the Defendant took this property under color of right, and in
good faith, believing it to be his property, there should
be a verdict of not guilty, although it may afterwards
turn out, and though the jury may believe it to be a
fact, that the property belonged to Frederick Berg."
The Court refused to give this instruction and in its stead
charged the jury as follows:
"That if you find that he afterwards discovered it to
be the property of Frederick Berg, and, after knowledge
that it was Frederick Berg's property, that he still
retained it, then, of course he would be guilty."
The jury convicted the Defendant.
tATT
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The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict, stating that the
charge to the jury was erroneous.

In so holding, the Court stated:

"It is an elementary principle that ignorance or
mistaken point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse. (Citation omitted). In
order to convict of larceny, the jury must be satisfied that the taking of the property was with a felonious
intent. It is not sufficient to find that, after the
taking, it was converted to the uses of Defendant, with a
felonious intent. It is necessary to find that the intent
to steal existed at the time of the taking. No subsequent
felonious intent will suffice.«
Therefore, the Court held that a mistaken belief 1n fact,
if honestly believed by the Defendant to be true will negate felonious intent.

I

Absent an intent to steal there is no larceny.

Therefore, since the Court had failed to instruct the jury adequately
on the necessary element of intent, and the excuse of mistake in
fact, it ordered a reversal.
In State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84 (1920) the Defendant

~

was charged with the crime of grand larceny under the old Utah
Criminal's Cr.de and was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a term
not exceeding ten years in the Utah State Prison.

The facts

introduced at trial showed that Defendant and his brother operated
a ranch which was comprised of 20,000 acres of unfenced lands.
The Defendant generally used his land for the grazing of sheep.
The land was generally arid and the only water obtainable for
watering his sheep was from a spring on the Defendants land.

The

Defendant constructed cement watering troughs at the spring where
his sheep could obtain water.
A large band of horses roamed on the open range and also in
need of water came to Defendants watering troughs for that purpose.
!ATT
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The horses were continually grazing on
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the Defendants grass needed for his sheep.
Defendant and some of his employees rounded up these horses
culled out those baring brands and turned them loose. · Those animals
remaining were driven by Defendant and his employees into a ravine
where they were shot and killed.

Defendant admitted at trial having

taken and killed these horses, but denied having any knowledge of
them being owned by anyone else.
to steal.

And he denied having any intent

Defendant thought these horses were wild and that they

were killing his sheep and damaging his property and therefo:re,
he felt he had a right to destroy them.
It turned out the horses did in fact belong to others and
these individuals filed a complaint charging Defendant with stealing
their horses.

Defendant was convicted of larceny.

The Court noted that in order to convict for grand larceny
under our statutes, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the taking was with a felonious intent.

That means there

must have been an intent to steal the property in question and
that such an intent must have existed at the time of taking of the
property.
The Court reviewed.the record and stated that it was unable
to find any evidence which would support a finding that Defendant
intended to steal any of the horses.

Defendant openly and re-

peatedly declared his purpose and intention in coralling and
shooting the horses.

His acts and conduct were in strict harmony

with such express purpose and intention.
The Court noted a well recognized rule that the jury is not
bound to believe what the accused may say concerning his motives,
IATT
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his purpose or his intentions.

It is the province of the jury

i

-18to determine such intentions based on the facts presented at trial.
The Court then stated:
"When, however, as here, the accused has openly,
repeatedly, and explicitly declared his purpose and
intention respecting the act in question, and his
declarations are not only not in conflict with the
manner in which the act was done, but are in strict
harmony and conformance therewith., may a jury say that
his intentions and purposes are not what his declarations
and acts indicate them to have been? While it is true t.'-1e
jury is not bound by the statements of the witness
respecting the purpose and intention of the accused and
that they may find that the real purpose and intention
of the accused were not as stated, yet there is a
limit beyond which a jury may not go."
The Court stated that in order to convict for a felony under
the laws of Utah, there must exist at tht time the crime is
committed a union or joint operation of the act and the intent ..
There must exist in the mind of the individual the intent to do
the prohibited act with which he is charged.

Therefore, he may

not be convicted of larceny unless there is a showing that he
intended to steal.
The Court found the Defendants purposes of coralling and
killing the horses was undoubtedly unlawful, but the Court states
that intent to steal may not be inferred from the unlawful act
alone.

The Court stated:

"The evidence in this case leaves no room for dispute,
or doubt even, that the only prupose and intention of
the Defendant was to take the horses in order to destroy
them.
That being so, the jury cannot legally find him
guilty of larceny, and this Court not only has the power,
but it has its duty, to set aside the verdict and judgment based thereon. 11 .
The Court thus held that where Defendant had taken the property
of another under a mistaken claim of rights that he could not be
convicted of the crime of larceny for the reason that if this
!ATT
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was no intent to steal.
to no one.

Defendant believed the horses belonged

They were damaging his property and he felt he had a

right to destroy them in order to save his property.

Thus, this

mistaken belief or a claim of right to the property, negatived.
the necessary criminal intent to steal.

The Court felt justified

in reversing and granting a new trial.
The courts of other jurisdictions have also followed this
rule.
In People v. Butler, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P. 2d 703, the
Defendant was convicted in a Los Angeles County Court of firstdegree felony murder and of assault with a deadly weapon.

The

Defendant had been employed by the deceased and went to the
deceased's home in order to be paid for his services.

The

decedent refused to pay the Defendant and pulled a gun on the
Defendant and threatened to use it.
his own gun.

The Defendant in turn pulled

They struggled, and the decedent was shot and

killed.
The Defendant honestly believing he was entitled to money
due and owing, took the decedent's wallet and left the premises.
Defendant was charged with robbery, and because the decedent had
died, with felony murder.
In reversing the conviction Justice Traynor stated that robbery
is but larceny aggrevated by the use of force or fear to accomplish
the taking of the property.

The Court then stated:

"The felonious intent requisite to robbery is the same
intent common to those offenses that, like larceny,
were grouped in the penil code designation of theft.
The taking of property is not theft in the absence of
an intent to steal, and a specific intent to steal 1.· e
an intent to deprive an owner permanently of this
property is an essential element of robbery."

. .,
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The Court noted that an intent to steal may in some instances
be inferred by the conduct of the Defendant.

The Court also noted

however, that proof of an existence of the state of mind which
is incompatible with an intent to steal will preclude a fining
of either theft or robbery.

In this regard, Justice Traynor

said:
"It has long been the rule in this State and generally
throughout the country that a bonafied belief, even
though mistakenly held, that one has a right or a claim
to the property negates felonious intent.n (Citations
omitted).
The Defendants only defense to the robbery murder was the
existence of an honest belief that he was entitled to the money.
The Trial Court in approving the prosecutor's argument that no
such defense existed removed completely from the consideration of
the jury

credible and

substantial evidence which would have

precluded a finding that Defendant had an intent to steal.

The

Court therefore held that the Defendant has a constitutional right
to have every significant fact determined by a jury.

The denial

of this right was a miscarriage of justice and the California
constitution therefore required a reversal.
The courts have also held that felonious intent may be
negated where the taking is open or in the presence of friends.
Where there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property and
no denial of the conduct in which the Defendant seeks to engage,
and where possession is not obtained by force or stelth, a
presumption of no felonious intent is raised, which must be
rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that felonious intent
existed.
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In Stanley v. State, 69 P. 2d 398 (1937 Okl.) the Defendant
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-21was charged with a larceny of one black sow and five black and red
spotted shoats which the evidence showed belonged to another.

The

sow and her young had for some period of time ranged over the
Defendants land and had mingled with the Defendants own pigs.
The brand-markings in the ears of the sow involved were similar
to those of the Defendants own stock.
The Defendant enlisted the aid of several of his neighbors
to round up the sow and shoats.

He declared to them on several

occasions that his intention was to capture and butcher the hogs.
The Defendant made no attempt to conceal his intention to
capture and kill the pigs.
to his neighbors repeatedly.

In fact he declared his intention
They all had a clear opportunity

to view the pigs and perceive their true ownership.

Only after

. the pigs were butchered did the true owner step fo:r.ward and claim
title to them.

When the Defendants refused to turn over the meat

or pay the owner for them was he charged with larceny.

The Court

stated that the evidence clearlyshowed the Defendant claimed the
hogs to be his and that he had a right to butcher them.

There was

not one word of testimony which would indicate any attempt on the
Defendant's part to coneal the hogs or the butchering of them.

They

were caught in a neighbors yard and penned there in daylight
hours.

There was no attempt to deceive or conceal what was being

done to the hogs.

In fact, all the testimony went to the affect

that the Defendant either butchered his own hogs or believed that
he was butchering his own hogs, even though they may have belonged
to another.

He did this in full view and in the presence of his

friends.
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The Court therefore held that the evidence for the State

-22failed to show criminal intent which must operate jointly with the
act to constitute larceny.
In so holding, the Court stated:
"It has been held universally by the courts not only in
this state but in other states, that, where the taking
is open and in the presence of friends, and there is
no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, and no
denial, and where possession is not obtained by force,
trickery, or stratagem, a strict presumption of fact
arises that there was no felonious intent which must
be repelled by clear and convincing evidence before a
jury may legitimately infer a felonious intent.
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to
show the necessary elements of the offense charge.
We therefore do not hesitate to say the judgment of
conviction should be reversed.".
In accord, see People v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30 P. 378;
Jordon v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. Rptr. 414, 296 SW 585; and People
v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 NW 770 (1934).
The general rule which is uniformly applied by the courts is
that in order to convict for the crime of theft (which under
76-6-404 includes larceny)

the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that all elements of the crime exist.

The State must prove

that the unlawful act occur.red and that this unlawful act was
accornpari.ied by a felonious inten-c. to steal.

The felonious intent

must have existed at the time the act was committed.

Where the

necessary element of intent is missing a conviction of theft or
larceny may not be sustained.

The courts have uniformly held that

an honest mistake in fact even though totally unreasonable is
sufficient to negate criminal intent.

Similarly the courts have

held that when the Defendant has openly and repeatedly declared
his intention and has acted in accordance with his stated intention
RATT
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-23negates criminal intent.

Such a presumption is rebutable, but it

must be rebuted by evidence which tends to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that criminal intent did in fact exist at the time of the
taking.
Utah has codified this common law rule in 1973 and is contained
in u.c.A. 76-4-402 (3} which provides as follows:
"It is a defense under this part that the actor: ( a)
acted under a claim of right to the property or service
involved; or (b) acted in an honest belief that he had
a right to obtain or exercise control over the property
or service as he did; or (c) obtained or exercised
control over the property or service honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have consented."
The existence of any one of these honest but mistaken claims
of right is an absolute statutory defense to the crime of theft
under 76-4-404.

Where any of these above stated elements can be

proven by facts introduced at trial, a conviction of theft under
the Utah Statute may not be sustained.
The Defendant Kazda was charged with a crime of theft under
76-6-404 U.C.A. 1953.

He was convicted by a jury in the Third

District Court, for Tooele County, on June 13, 1975.
Under the new Utah Criminal Code the person commits theft
when: "he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof."
76-4-404.

The necessary elements of theft are therefore the

act of obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over property
which belongs to another person coupled with the intent to purposefully deprive the rightful owner of that property.
The Utah Statute defines purpose to deprive as follows:
76-6-401 ( 3) :
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-24"This means to have the co::1science object: (a) to withhold
property permanently or for so extended a period or to
use under such circumstances that a substantial portion
of its economic value or of the use and benefit thereof
will be· lost; or (b) to restore the property only upon.
payment of a reward or other compensation; or (c) to
dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it."
Thus, in order to deprive a person permanently of his
property the taker must have had the conscience object to steal
the property.

You must therefore have had the intent to steal

and this is a necessary element of the crime of theft.

Absent

and intent to steal there is no theft and a conviction may not be
sustained.
The law in the majority of jurisdictions and in the State of
Utah is that criminal intent may be negated in two ways.

I

One,

by the showing of an honest but mistaken belief in fact which tends
to nega·te criminal intent.

This rule was codified by the Utah

Legislature in 1973 and is now found in U.C.A. 76-6-402 (3).
Second, where the taking is open and in the presence of friends, and

I
I

there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property or his
activities concerning that property, and where possession of that.
property was not obtained by force, a strict presumption of fact
arises that there was no felonious intent.

And where the actor

has declared his intentions concerning the property and his actions
conform thereto a jury is obligated to believe the Defendants
declarations of intentions; State v. Allen, supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that it may notice error

I
:

W1'1ich exis·ts on the record which blatantly prejudices the Defendant,
even though no exception was made at trial by defense counsel.
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This

is an exception to the general rule and C"le Court will o!lly apply
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it in those criminal and some civil cases w~1ere the fundamental
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rights of liberties of the individual are at stake.

Thus, where

the Trial Court failed to instruct the jury concerning a necessary
element of the crime charged or a defense thereto which was so hlatant on the record and which allowed the jury to convict without
giving a fair and impartial determination to all the fact, the
court has a duty to notice such error and reverse and remand
for a new trial; State v. Cobo, supra.
At trial, defense counsel failed to request an instruction by
the Court to the effect that an honest, even though unreasonable
or mistaken belief, of a claim of right to the property involved,
constitutes an absolute statutory defense to the crime of theft
under 76-4-404 and 76-6-402 (3).
on its own.

The

The Court failed to so instruct

overall effect of this failure to so c~arge the

jury worked a manifest prejudice to the Defendant.

The Defendant

was convicted and sentenced to a five year term in the Utah State
Penitentiary.

The conviction was based on facts introduced at

trial which clearly established that the Defendant acted with an
honest belief that he had a contract, and the right to exercise
control over the property involved.

The Defendants honest belief,

even though unreasonably and mistakenly held, is sufficient to
negate criminal intent and therefore constitutes an absolute defense
to the charge of theft.
Here, Defendant Kennis Kazda entered into what he believed
to be a valid contract with a man he believed ,:.-,orked for Mountain
Bell Telephone.

I

I

Mr. Johnson, the man with whom Kazda contracted

represented to the Defendant that he worked for Mountain Bell.
The Defendant observed Mr. Johnson driving a Mountain Bell truck.
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Therefore, he could have reasonably believed that Mr. Johnson was
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employed by Mountain Bell.
Under the terms of the contract entered into, defendant Kazda
was to remove specific wires in the Tooele, Rush Valley Area, which
were at that time not in service.

Defendant Kazda and Mr. Johnson

entered the boundaries of the Hogan Ranch on September 26, 1974.
At that time Mr. Johnson preceded to show the Defendant which wires
were in fact not in service and therefore should be cut down.

In

the course of surveying the Hogan property defendant Kazda's truck
became stuck in an irrigation ditch in full view of Mr. Degelback,
a Hogan Ranch employee.

The Defendant approached Mr. Degelback who

I

was the State's first witness at trial and at that time told_ :him of
his contract for the removal of the wires.

The Defendant sought

I
Ii

Mr. Degelback's permission to re-enter the Hogan Ranch and remove the
wires.

At that time the Defendant and Mr. Degelback were face to

face in conversation.

The Defendant made no attempt to conceal his

•
'

identity nor was there any attempt by the Defendant to deceive
Mr. Degelback as to his reason for being on the Hogan property.
He openly stated that he had a contract and was seeking permission
to come onto the Hogan land to remove the wire.
On October 1st the Defendant and his two co-defendants Mr.
Reay and Mr. Stockton did come onto the Hogan premises.

They

entered in the daylight hours and drove Kazda's own truck within
full view of the Hogan home.

They parked the truck in an open

field not far from the Hogan home and proceeded to cut down the
wires.

These actions were instruct accordance with the Defendants

stated declaration to Mr. Degelback, that they had a contract for
the removal of the wires.
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The Defendants at all times were within

full view of t~1e highway where anyone on that road could have seen
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their actions.

They were also in full view of the Hogan home and

Mr. Leland Hogan and his wife, Joyce Hogan both testified to the
fact that they observed the Defendants cutting down the wires.
Later, when Mountain Bell Telephone Company representatives
arrived on the scene the Defendants again declared that they had
a contract for the removal of the wire.

Defendant Kazda testified

that he observed the approaching telephone truck from a long
distance away.

He further testified that he knew of an escape

route which would have taken him safely away from the telephone
company men..

Nevertheless, the Defendant and his two companions

did not attempt to leave the area.
the area.

They had no reason to leave

The Defendant believed he had a valid contract.

In

fact, the telephone representatives testified at trial, that the
Defendants expressed their relief at seeing the telpho!le company
men.

The telephone lines which the Defendants were cutting down

had become entangled on hot power lines.

The Defendants hoped

the telephone company employees would help them remove these lines
from the power line.
The defendant Kazda was so confident that he had a contract
he did not even attempt to flee when Mr. Winchester, Mountain Bell's
representative left the three Defendants with Mr. Manzione and went
to the Hogan home to telephone Salt Lake City in order to
confirm the validity of the contract.

The three Defendants were

with a single man and could easily have overpowered him and left
the area in the Defendants 4-wheel drive pickup truck, but they
did not do this.

Instead they remained feeling they had done

nothing wrong.
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Later, when the police deputies arrived, all three Defendants
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-28again represented that they had a contract and readily produced
identification to the police at their request.

Again, there

was no attempt to conceal their activities or their identity.
There was no attempt to flee the area.

The Defendants had no need

,

to flee the area, because they honestly believed they had a valid
contract for the removal of these wires.

In all encounters with

the prosecution's witnesses the Defendant openly declared that he
had a contract to remove these wires.

All of his actions were in

conformance with his stated declaration.
The jury is, of course, entitled to believe or disbelieve
the Defendant's testimony and weight it evely with that of any
other witness testifying at the trial.

The jury need not accor~

the Defendant's testimony any greater weight than they would any
other witness.

Nor is the jury obligated to believe the Defendant's

statements or declarations of his intent.

But as the Court said in

State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84:
When, however, as here the accused has openly,
repeatedly, and explicitly declared his purpose and
intention respecting the acting question, and his
declarations are not only not in conflict with the
manner in which the act was done, but are in
strict harmony and conformity therewith, may a jury
say that his intention and purpose are not what his
declarations and acts indicate them to have been? 11
11

The Court then stated:
"While it is true that the jury is not bound by the
statements of a witness representing the purpose and
intentions of the accused and that they may find that
the real purpose and intention of the accused were not
as stated, yet there is a limit beyond which a jury
may not go.n
Here the Defendant openly represented to everyone that he had
a valid and binding contract for the removal of telephone wires:
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He made no attempt to conceal his identity or to conceal or deceive

-29anyone in regards to the activities in which he sought to engage.
Thus, his actions were in strict conformance with his stated
declaration.

In light of these facts, the jury may not totally

disregard the Defendant's stated declarations of his intentions.
The evidence therefore tends to go against the State's contention that the Defendant had the conscience object to deprive
Mountain Bell of their wire at the time he cut it down.

To the

contrary, the evidence indicates the Defendant acted under an honest,
but mistaken belief that he had a valid and binding contract.
of his actions are in conformance with this stated belief.

Al,l

Under

Utah Law, an honest mistaken fact is an absolute statutory defense
to the crime of theft. 76-6-402 (3).

Under Uta.>i Law, in order to

convict of the crime of theft, the State must prove all of the
necessary elements of the crime existed at the time of the taking.
The State must show the Defendant had the intent to steal the
property at the time he cut the wires down.

Even though the taking.

of the property itself may have been unlawful, if the felonious
intent to steal is absent at the time of taking there has been no
theft; State v~ Allen, supra.

I
I
I,,

The law clearly states that a mistaken fact if honestly believed,
even if totally unreasonable, is sufficient to negate criminal
intent.

It has also beeen universally held that where the taking

is open and in the presence of friends and in conformance with the
stated declarations of the accused and there is no subsequent
attempt to conceal the property and no denial of the taking, and
possession is not obtained by force, that a strict presumption of
fact arises that there was no felonious intent.
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This presumption

must be repelled by evidence which proves beyond a reasonable
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-30doubt that a felonious intent in fact did exist; Stanley v. State,
supra.
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to show the
necessary elements of criminal intent.

To the contrary, all of

the evidence indicates that the Defendant mistakenly and honestly
believed that he had a valid and binding contract.

Acting upon this

mistaken belief, he enlisted the aid of two companions and proceeded
to the Hogan premises where they cut down the wires.

The Defendant

openly decla=d that he had a cnntract to all iliose in which he
came in contact.

He did not attemp to conceal his activities nor

did he deny the fact that he had cut down the wire.

The Defendant

made no attempt to remove the wire from the Hogan premises.

In

fact, the Defendant testified that he was to leave the wire there
and Mountain Bell would pick :J_t up at a later time.

No witness

for the State indicated that they observed any wire in the truck
of the Defendant.

None of the State's witnesses saw any spools

which would aid in the coiling of the wire and its removal from the
property.
The evidence produced at trial clearly shows that the Defendant
acted under an honest, although mistaken, claim of right.

·ttis

actions were instruct conformance with his stated declarations.
Under the law, this is sufficient to raise a strict presumption
of no criminal intent.

The State has the burden, to rebut this

presumption with evidence which tends to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant did in fact have the intent to steal ~t
the time he committed the act.

The evidence produced at trial

clearly fails to carry this burden.
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the Defendant was convicted.

In spite of this evidence,

Thus the Court's failure to charge
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-31the jury, to the effect that a finding of an honest but mistaken
· belief of fact would be a total defense to the crime, severely
prejudiced the Defendant.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously

held that when an error exists on the record which is so blatantly
erroneous that its effect is to prevent the jury from giving a
fair and impartial determination of the facts, the Supreme Court
may take notice of such errors.

The Court may notice such error

even though it was not excepted to at trial.

In fact, the Court

has stated that it is its duty to take notice of such error; State

v. Cobo, supra.
Here, the Defendant's case was prejudiced by the Court's failure
to so charge the jury.

The Court's failure to so charge the jury

that an honest b~lief to claim of right to obtain or exercise
control over the property, even though mistakenly held, would have
constituted an absolute defense to the crime of theft, allowed the
jury to convict the Defendant on less than the requisite statutory
intent.

Before a conviction for th_eft may be sustained, the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did act
with the requisite felonious intent at the time of the taking.
the State has failed to carry that burden.

Here,

Thus the jury's con-

viction is clearly erroneous and worked a blatant prejudice on the
rights and liberties of the Defendant, Dennis D. Kazda.

Thus,-

under the authority of State v. Cobo, supra and State v. Peterson,
supra, this Court has a duty to notice that error and to correct
it even though no exception was taken thereto at trial.

The Trial

Court should have instructed the jury that an honest but mistaken
belief in fact constituted an absolute defense under the statute.
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believed the Defendant was acting under an honest, even though
totally unreasonable mistake of fact, that he could not have been
guilty of theft because he did not have the necessary criminal
intent.

Therefore, the Defendant has been highly prejudiced

and this Court should note this error and correct it by reversing
the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial.
POINT II
THE COURT BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT RECKLESS INTENT WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT UNDER 76-4-404, ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT
ON LESS THAN A REASONABLE DOUBT OF A CONSCIENCE OBJECT TO DEPRIVE
THE OWNER OF ITS PROPERTY.
The Court charged the jury as follows concerning the intent
element of the crime:
"For the purposes of this case, the terms used in the
Court instructions are defined as follows:
, ,1.

Intentionally means that with respect to the nature
of the Defendants conduct or a result of his
conduct, it was the Defendants conscience objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

2.

Knowingly means that with respect to Defendants
conduct or circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or
the existing circumstances. That is, a person acts
knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware his conduct is reasonably certain
to deprive the owner of the property.

3.

Reckless intent with respect to circumstances
surrounding ones conduct means conduct which a
person is aware of but consciencely disregards that
a substantial risk that a persons property will be
taken.

4.

Obtain or exercise unauthorized control means the
unlawful use of the PToperty which would deprive
the owner of a substantial portion of its economical
value or of the use and benefits thereof, a.'1d if
not limited to a taking and carrying away."

Defense counsel did, at trial, take exception to the court's
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instructions regarding intent. (T 219).
stating:

Defense counsel excepted

I

-33"In every crime or public offense, there must be a
union of the act and the intent.
In the crime of
theft, the element of intent must be that conscience
intent to deprive the owner of his property. The
intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances
connected with the offense and the sound mind and
discretion of the accused."
All presumptions of law, ir.dependent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a man is presumed to be innocent
until he is.proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
If
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether this defendant,
Dennis Kazda, had the conscience intent to deprive Mountain
Bell Telephone Company of its wires, he is entitled to a
verdict of not guilty."
It is our contention on appeal that the Court's failure to
instruct the jury, as requested by the Defendant, was extremely
prejudicial in that it allowed the jury to convict on a finding
of reckless disregard for the rights and property of another
rather than upon finding of a conscience object to deprive the
owner of his property.
Defendant Kazda was charged with the crime of theft under
u.c.A. 76-6-404.

This section provides as follows:

"A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof."
In order to convict under this statute the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Dennis Kazda, did in
fact cut and remove Mountain Bell's telephone wires with a conscience object or felonious intent to steal and therefore deprive
Mountain Bell of its property.

A necessary element of this

crime is the felonious taking.

The Defendant must have had the

intent to steal at the time in which he was taking the property
in order to sustain the conviction under this statute.
Where the State fails to prove the necessary intent to steal
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a conviction under this statute must be reversed.

Peoole v. Miller,

-344 Utah 410, 11 P. 514; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84;
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah
229, 240 P. 2d 504; People v. Devine, 55 Cal. 227, 30 P. 378:
People v. Butler, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P. 2d 703 and Stanley v.
State, 69 P. 2d 398 (Okl.} •
. In State v. Cobo, supra, the Defendant was tried and convicted:
of voluntary manslaughter.
The Court noted that under the Utah statutes which at that
. time was 103-28-5 R.S. Utah 1933 that to constitute voluntary
manslaughter the killing must be with an intention to do great
bodily harm.

The Court stated:

"Our statute was copied from California, and in that
state it has been held that in order to constitute
voluntary manslaughter t..~e intent to kill must exist,
a killing without malice or intent to kill, in the
commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony constitutes involuntary manslaughter."
The Trial Court charged the jury as follows:
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, as charged in the information, you must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the following
elements:
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(1)

That Frank G. McIntyre was killed on or about the
18th day of May, 1933, at Juab County, State of
Utah.

(2)

That said killing was the direct result of Frank
G. McIntyre being beaten on, over, in or upon the
face by Defendant Pete Cobo, with some means
unknown, instruments or weapons.

(3)

That the killing by said Pete Cobo, if you believe
he killed said Frank G. McIntyre, was upon the
sudden quarrel or in a heat of passion.

It is not enough that one or more of these elements be
proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt,
but all of said elements _must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt before you can find the Defendant guilty
of murder (the Court regarded the charge of guilty of
murder as simply a slip of-the-tongue which did not affect

the jury), in the first-degree, as charged in the information."
The Supreme Court noted that the elements of the crime constituting voluntary manslaughter involved a willful or intentional
killing or the willful or intentional infliction of great bodily
harm resulting in death.

The Court examined the record and found

no evidence which would indicate an intent to kill.

The Court

then stated:
"As is seen, the charge wholly eliminated that essential
and dominant element of voluntary manslaughter. In other
words, to convict the Defendant of voluntary manslaughter,
the offense for which the Defendant was convicted, the jury
were permitted by the charge to do so without finding that
the killing was either willful or intentional, thus
misdirecting the jury with respect to the elements of the
offense for which the accused was convicted.
That such error was manifest and of necessity resulted to
the prejudice of the accused and deprived him of a fair
trial cannot well be doubted."
The Court therefore granted the reversal and a new trial to
the Defendant.
Here, defendant Kazda was convicted as charged of theft of
copper wire.

Under the Utah statute an essential element of theft

is the intentional stealing or the conscience object of depriving
the owner of his property.

When the Court charged the jury

concerning reckless intent which is the

wanton

disregard of the

rights of others in the property, it in effect allowed the jury
to convict the Defendant on less than the required felonious intent.
Defendant Kazda was reckless in the sense that he did not
take the trouble to ascertain the validity of his contract.
!:lad a writing in his hand which he assumed was valid.

He

He neither

asked nor did Mr •. Johnson furnish any proof of employment or
proof of authority to b2 contracting in the name of Mountain Bell.
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A man of reasonable in~elligence and education should have questioned

-36both the validity of the contract itself and of the• authority
of Mr. Johnson to contract for Mountain Bell.
Kazda is not a man of average education.

However, defendant

He testified the extent

of his formal education as an eleventh grade level.
out of high school and did not receive a diploma.

He dropped
At the age of

nineteen, he was convicted of a felony and spent nine and 1/2
years in the Utah State Penitentiary.

Certainly whatever education

he received while in the State Penitentiary was not in contract
formation.
However, the Court's charge to the jury on reckless intent
would allow the jury to convict for the offense charged without
ever having found felonious intent as is required under the
statute.

The jury, under the charge of the Court could reasonably

have found Defendant Kazda to have been reckless in the fact that
he did not ascertain the validity of the contract and therefore
convicted him for this reckless behavior and not because of the
conscience objective to deprive Mountain

Bell of their property.

Under 76-6-404, to convict for theft, there must be proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had the intent to
deprive·the owners of their property, at the time of the taking ..
Nowhere does the statute mention that reckless intent· will be sufficient to sustain a conviction under this statute.

Therefore,

the Court's charge allowed the jury to convict on less evidence
than is required, thus creqting a manifest injustice to defendant
Kazda in that he was convicted on less than proven intent to steal.
THEREFORE, Appellant maintains that the Trial Court erred
in its charge to the jury and its conviction of the Defendant under
this erroneous charge has worked a gross miscarriage of justice
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which must be remedied by this Court.

This Court should reverse

the conviction and remend for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Steven E. Clyde·
./
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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